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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

WARNER BROS. RECORDS INC., et
al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-00874-RBJMEH

CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC.’S OBJECTION TO
RECOMMENDATION BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO DENY
CHARTER’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Case 1:19-cv-00874-RBJ-MEH Document 81 Filed 11/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 2 of 25

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 4

II.

LEGAL STANDARD ......................................................................................................... 6

III.

THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION .............................. 7

IV.

A.

Allegations That an ISP Merely Advertised and Charged for High Speed
Internet Service Does Not Satisfy the Financial Benefit Prong of Vicarious
Copyright Infringement .......................................................................................... 7

B.

Charter Does Not Have the Practical Ability to Control the Infringing
Activity Necessary to Satisfy the Second Prong of Vicarious Liability ............... 18

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 21

i

Case 1:19-cv-00874-RBJ-MEH Document 81 Filed 11/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 3 of 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
A & M Records v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................10
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) .....................................................................................................2, 3, 8, 11
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) .........................................................................................................3, 8, 11
BMG Rights Management v. Cox Communications,
149 F. Supp. 3d 634 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2015) ..........................................................................13
Coach, Inc. v. Swap Shop, Inc.,
2012 WL 12887010 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2012) .........................................................................6
Ellison v. Robertson,
357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................................6, 10
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 913 (2005) .................................................................................................................12
Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265 (1986) ...................................................................................................................3
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,
488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) ...................................................................................................6
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc.,
847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017) .............................................................................................5, 7, 8
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com,
508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ...........................................................................................12, 13
Robbins v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
519 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................3
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co.,
316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).......................................................................................................6
Thomson v. HMC Grp.,
2014 WL 12589313 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2014) ..........................................................................7

ii

Case 1:19-cv-00874-RBJ-MEH Document 81 Filed 11/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 4 of 25

Tomelleri v. Zazzle, Inc.,
No. 13-CV-02576-EFM-TJJ, 2015 WL 8375083 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2015) ............................8, 9
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Grande,
2018 WL 1096871 (Feb. 28, 2018)....................................................................................10, 11
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.,
2009 WL 334022 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009), aff’d sub nom.
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC,
667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion withdrawn, superseded, and aff’d on
reh’g, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) .........................................................................................7
Other Authorities
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................2, 3

iii

Case 1:19-cv-00874-RBJ-MEH Document 81 Filed 11/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 5 of 25

Defendant Charter Communications, Inc. (“Charter”), by and through its
attorneys Fairfield and Woods, P.C. and Winston & Strawn, LLP, hereby objects to
the October 21, 2019 Recommendation to deny Charter’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claim for vicarious liability by Magistrate Judge Hegarty (the
“Recommendation”), and as grounds therefor states as follows:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Charter respectfully requests that the Recommendation be overruled for at

least one of the following two reasons. First, the Recommendation reflects a
fundamental misapplication of the financial benefit prong of vicarious copyright
liability. It holds that Plaintiffs’ allegations against an internet service provider
(“ISP”), like Charter here, could plausibly satisfy the pleading standard for this
prong based on allegations that Charter advertised fast speed (like every ISP) and
charged customers for increasing bandwidth (like every ISP). But any financial
benefit sufficient to establish this prong of vicarious liability must be direct, not
merely incidental. The allegations set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and relied on in
the Recommendation are insufficient, even if true, to show a direct financial benefit.
Charter earns the same amount of money for a subscription, commensurate with the
level of bandwidth, regardless of whether a subscriber accesses the internet for
lawful or infringing uses. Plaintiffs’ Complaint is bereft of any specific allegations
that users were drawn to Charter’s services to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights, as
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opposed to efficiently access the internet, including to access music generally, which
of course, users can do lawfully. Under long-standing precedent, this renders any
financial benefit from any alleged infringement incidental, not direct, and thus
insufficient as a matter of law to satisfy the financial benefit prong of vicarious
liability. By relaxing the direct financial benefit prong to something far more
attenuated than what is required, the Recommendation threatens to open the
floodgates for massive liability against ISPs for merely advertising and making
available high speed internet to the general public.
Second, the Recommendation also implausibly presumes that Charter has the
practical ability to halt the alleged infringements, based solely on allegations that its
user agreement allows Charter to terminate internet access for violation of its
policies. Charter does not host the allegedly infringing content, but merely provides
a pipe to connect subscribers to the internet. Thus, Charter cannot access or disable
any allegedly infringing content and the Complaint does not allege otherwise.
Plaintiffs’ suggestion, adopted in the Recommendation, that Charter should have
simply responded to each notice by terminating internet access altogether is also a
drastic measure that would cut off internet access not only for the accused infringer
but for everyone else using the internet through that subscriber’s account. The
Recommendation’s proposed termination of internet access would take place before
any copyright infringement is proved, and regardless of the extent to which
5
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legitimate use occurs through the same account. Indeed, Charter’s subscribers
include businesses, libraries, universities, military bases, families and others where
only one or a small fraction of affected internet users (e.g., those who would have
their internet access terminated) might have used such access to infringe copyrights.
Termination of internet access is a blunt tool. It does not give Charter the practical
ability to control any alleged infringement, as it cannot prevent Charter’s customers
(or those who used Charter’s customers’ accounts to allegedly infringe) from finding
internet access to infringe elsewhere.
For the reasons stated herein, Charter respectfully objects to the
Recommendation, and requests that the District Court grant Charter’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for vicarious liability.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
As Charter’s motion was brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]o survive,” Plaintiffs’ Complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim” for relief that “is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Twombly, at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,

6
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286 (1986)). “The allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the
plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.” Robbins v. Okla. ex
rel. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008).
Here, in denying Charter’s motion to dismiss, the Recommendation relies on
allegations 1 that fail, as a matter of law, to set forth sufficient facts to establish the
requisite elements for vicarious liability.
III.

THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION
A.

Allegations That an ISP Merely Advertised and Charged for High
Speed Internet Service Does Not Satisfy the Financial Benefit
Prong of Vicarious Copyright Infringement

Courts have long held that in order to satisfy the first prong of vicarious
liability, a defendant must profit directly, rather than incidentally, from the alleged
infringements. Plaintiffs allege that Charter advertised its “high speed” internet
service as “enable[ing] subscribers to ... download 8 songs in 3 seconds.” (Rec. at
11; Compl. ¶ 75.)

The Complaint further alleges that “[m]any of Charter’s

customers are motivated to subscribe to Charter’s service because it allows them to
download music and other copyrighted content—including unauthorized content—
as efficiently as possible.” (Compl. ¶ 75.)

Of course, being “motivated” to

Even though Charter’s Motion is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), which requires assessing the
sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint, the Recommendation does not cite to Plaintiffs’
Complaint. Instead, the Recommendation only cites Plaintiffs’ allegations as characterized in
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Charter’s Motion to Dismiss, which in multiple cases, as noted herein, is
not an accurate recitation of what is actually alleged in the Complaint.
1

7
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“download music” as “efficiently as possible” does not equate to being “drawn” to
Charter’s internet services to infringe, as there are many lawful means to download
copyrighted music such as through authorized services like iTunes. This allegation
as set forth in the Complaint does not even say that users are actually drawn to
Charter’s service to download unauthorized content, but merely that Charter’s
service would “allow” the downloading of music, which would “include[e][]
unauthorized content.” (Id.) Nevertheless, the Recommendation relies on the
allegation that these advertisements “motivated” some unnamed subset of Charter’s
users to subscribe to Charter. (Id. at 9-11.) These allegations utterly fail to establish
that infringing activity was a draw to subscribe to Charter’s service.
The Recommendation also relies on Plaintiffs’ purported allegations about the
efficiency of infringing through “BitTorrent” programs that are generally available
on the internet, but which Charter has nothing to do with. (Rec. at 3-4.) The
Recommendation relies on the allegation that some users accessing the internet
through Charter subscriptions have used such service to “pirate” 2 Plaintiffs’ works
(Rec. at 11), and Plaintiffs’ alleged identification between 2012 and 2015 of
“hundreds of thousands” of instances in which users that were traced to Charter’s

The word “pirate,” though quoted in the Recommendation, does not appear in Plaintiffs’
Complaint, but appears repeatedly in Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Charter’s Motion to Dismiss.
2

8
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subscriber accounts used Charter’s high speed internet service to distribute
Plaintiffs’ songs.
The Recommendation also relies on Plaintiffs’ characterization of its
allegation as set forth in its Opposition (ECF 50 at 12) that “once [Charter’s]
subscribers realized that [Charter] did not intend to stop or control the infringement,”
the subscribers were encouraged to “purchase more bandwidth” which meant more
subscription fees for Charter. (Rec. at 12.) But Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not
actually allege this; rather it merely alleges that “Charter’s customers, in turn,
purchased more bandwidth and continued using Charter’s services to infringe
Plaintiffs’ copyrights,” because Charter “condoned” the illegal activity. (See Compl.
at ¶ 77.) The Complaint does not allege that because Charter’s subscribers realized
that Charter did not “stop or control the infringement” such subscribers then
purchased more bandwidth. Nevertheless, the Recommendation found these purely
speculative “allegations”—never actually alleged in the Complaint—“sufficient to
demonstrate a causal relationship between the infringing activity alleged in this case
and any financial benefit the [Charter] reaps in this case.” See Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir. 2017).
There are also no allegations that infringing material, much less unauthorized
access to Plaintiffs’ alleged works, acted as a draw to subscribe to Charter’s internet
service. Indeed, there is no allegation (nor could there be) that Charter would have
9

Case 1:19-cv-00874-RBJ-MEH Document 81 Filed 11/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 11 of 25

earned any less in subscriber fees for the legitimate uses of high-speed internet as
opposed to any infringing use through the same account. For instance, many
accounts are paid for by a business, a library, a military base, or a family.
Subscribers and users of those accounts have used Charter’s high speed internet
service for countless legitimate purposes that are vital to how our society functions
today—from information gathering, to work purposes, to education, to emergency
services, to social interaction. Charter charges the same price to subscribers
regardless of whether some subset of a subscriber’s users allegedly use their Charter
internet access to infringe Plaintiffs’ works. (See Comp. at ¶ 74.) Plaintiffs do not
allege otherwise. Id. This renders any financial connection between Charter’s
subscribers and the alleged infringement attenuated and indirect, and insufficient to
plausibly satisfy the financial benefit prong of vicarious liability.
Despite a detailed discussion in Charter’s motion to dismiss (ECF 38 at pp. 710 (footer)) (the “Motion”), the financial benefit analysis in the Recommendation
makes no mention of the fundamental principles from which vicarious liability
originated—clearly articulated in dance hall and swap meet cases that show that
courts have consistently applied these same principles over the last fifty years. The
vicarious liability copyright cases began with Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309-310 (2d Cir. 1963), where the court found no
sufficient direct financial benefit by a landlord who provided the space and access
10
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to property yet collected the same amount of rent from tenants regardless of the
allegedly infringing activity taking place on the premises. Conversely, a dance hall
operator who was taking advantage of the use of infringing music was sufficiently
obtaining a direct financial benefit.
More recently, Coach, Inc. v. Swap Shop, Inc., 2012 WL 12887010, at *8
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2012) articulated the difference between a direct financial benefit
and an indirect one. The Swap Shop court found on the one hand that a swap meet
operator who organized the retailers selling knock off purses was sufficiently alleged
to have a direct financial benefit from infringement through obtaining rents directly
from the known infringer vendors, as well as increased parking and concession fees
fueled by the sale of known infringing purses. Id. On the other hand, the landlord
of the swap meet—who earned the same amount of money in rent for infringing and
non-infringing uses, and was not directly supervising the infringing activities—was
found to not have a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity. Id.
By failing to acknowledge these cases and their import for the direct financial
benefit prong of vicarious liability, the Recommendation misconstrues the basic
principles of vicarious liability. It instead essentially carves out a new, lesser
standard for the direct financial benefit prong at odds with the jurisprudence that has
been consistently applied across the nation for decades, and more recently to ISPs.
See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.10 (9th Cir. 2004) (an ISP must
11
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attract subscriptions “because of” the infringement to establish a direct financial
benefit); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding no vicarious liability because evidence that “[defendant] ‘hosts’ websites
for a fee” was too sparse to show a direct financial benefit and thus not “a draw” to
subscribers); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 2009 WL 334022, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009), aff’d sub nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital
Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011), opinion withdrawn, superseded, and
aff’d on reh’g, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissing vicarious liability claim
where financial benefit was too attenuated to be direct); Thomson v. HMC Grp., 2014
WL 12589313, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2014) (dismissing vicarious liability claim
where infringing content was not the draw for defendant’s patients).
While the Recommendation does cite Perfect 10 with respect to its draw
analysis, it misapplies it. (Rec. at 9.) Critically, the infringing activity must be more
than an “added benefit” to a subscription; it must be the attracting factor, or the
“draw” for subscribers. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 674 (9th
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 504, 199 L. Ed. 2d 385 (2017).
An ISP charging for high speed internet—or digital access— is analogous to
the landlords in Shapiro and Coach, who are paid for the commensurate amount of
physical space that they provide regardless of whether copyright infringement occurs
in that space. Charter, like any ISP, earns the same amount from subscribers,
12

Case 1:19-cv-00874-RBJ-MEH Document 81 Filed 11/04/19 USDC Colorado Page 14 of 25

including higher payments for increased bandwidth speeds (analogous to higher rent
for larger physical space), regardless of whether the customer uses the internet
access purchased through Charter to infringe. This is true no matter how much
bandwidth a customer purchases—it does not affect Charter’s revenues whether a
subscriber (or others using that subscriber’s internet access) uses the internet to
infringe copyrights, and/or for legitimate purposes, such as to seek out information,
for education, to find news, to perform job searches, to complete work tasks, to
communicate, and for other social and entertainment uses, including the lawful
downloading of music.
The Recommendation also relies on Perfect 10 for the proposition that the
“[t]he size of the ‘draw’ relative to a defendant’s overall business is immaterial” and
that “[t]he essential aspect of the ‘direct financial benefit’ inquiry is whether there is
a causal relationship between the infringing activity and any financial benefit a
defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in proportion to a
defendant’s overall profits.” Id. But the Perfect 10 court goes on to explain that the
allegation must be about a draw specifically relating to the plaintiff’s work at issue—
and cannot be a draw based upon “copyright infringement in general.” Id. As the
court explained, the direct financial benefit prong of the vicarious infringement test
“demands more than evidence that customers were ‘drawn’ to [the defendant ISP]

13
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to obtain access to infringing material in general,” but for a “specific copyrighted”
work owned by the plaintiff. Id.
At best, Plaintiffs’ allegation regarding Charter’s customers “motivation” to
subscribe to Charter’s internet service is that users were drawn to Charter to
efficiently download music, which may generally include copyrighted music.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “[m]any of Charter’s customers are motivated to
subscribe to Charter’s service because it allows them to download music and other
copyrighted content—including unauthorized content—as efficiently as possible.”
(Compl. ¶ 75 (emphasis added).) There is no allegation that a subscriber was
“motivated” to subscribe to Charter’s internet service to specifically infringe any of
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. Conclusory, speculative allegations of a “draw” are
not enough to be plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
The Recommendation further relies on Tomelleri’s statement that “[t]he
financial benefit may be established [ ] ‘by showing that users are attracted to a
defendant’s product because it enables infringement and that [] use of the product
for infringement financially benefits the defendant.’” Tomelleri v. Zazzle, Inc., No.
13-CV-02576-EFM-TJJ, 2015 WL 8375083, at *15 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2015)
(emphasis added). Tomelleri found there was no draw under the financial benefit
prong where a fish illustrator sued a website operator that allowed users to create
and sell customized products. Id. at *3-4. The plaintiff alleged that sixty-two of his
14
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designs had been copied on the defendant’s website without his authorization. Id. at
*4. But even in a case where the website was offering the very tools to facilitate the
alleged infringement, Tomelleri found no direct financial benefit existed because
users were not “drawn” to the site because they could infringe, but because they
could make their own products. Id. at *15.
Likewise, here, there are no plausible allegations that subscribers are drawn
to Charter’s high speed internet service to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights; they are
drawn to Charter’s internet service to obtain high speed internet that assists with
nearly every facet of their life. The fact that such access could also make music
downloading faster in general, which could incidentally make infringement occur
faster (as it would make nearly everything online operate faster), is not enough to
plausibly allege that the financial benefit to Charter from any infringements is direct.
Instead, any such alleged benefit is merely an incidental, added benefit that flows
from the general draw of high speed internet access. And even if Plaintiffs had
alleged a plausible “draw” (which they have not), once again, the “use of the
product”—Charter’s high speed internet—“for infringement” does not “financially
benefit[] the defendant,” as Charter’s receipt of monthly subscription fees is the
same regardless of whether the access it provides is used in part to infringe
copyrights. Id.

15
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The Recommendation cites the Ellison case in analyzing the financial benefit
prong, but omits the following explanation from Ellison:
There are, however, cases in which customers value a
service that does ‘not act as a draw.’ Accordingly,
Congress cautions courts that ‘receiving a one-time
set-up fee and flat periodic payments for service…
[ordinarily] would not constitute receiving a ‘financial
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.’
S Rep. 105-190, at 44. But ‘where the value of the
service lies in providing access to infringing material,’
courts might find such a ‘one-time set-up and flat
periodic’ fees to constitute a direct financial benefit. Id.
at 44-45. Thus, the central question of the ‘direct
financial benefit’ inquiry in this case is whether
infringing activity constitutes a draw for subscribers,
not just an added benefit.
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
This case is precisely the type that Congress cautioned about. There are no
plausible allegations that the value of Charter’s high speed internet access lies in
infringing activity. Any infringement would be an “added benefit” to the value of
internet access for consumers—not a draw. Ellison also discusses a distinction
highly pertinent to this case between the “draw” of customers to Napster and AOL.
Distinguishing A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Napster II)—Ellison noted that virtually “all of Napster’s ‘draw’ of customers
resulted from Napster providing access to infringing material” and the “relatively
insignificant draw” present when considering the “vast array of products and
services” offered by the defendant AOL. 357 F.3d at 1078. Because there was
16
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nothing to support the allegation that “AOL attracted or retained subscriptions
because of the infringement or lost subscriptions because of AOL’s eventual
obstruction of the infringement,” the plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim failed. Id. at
1079. Similarly, here, the vast array of uses and services available to Charter’s
customers through its high speed internet offerings likewise renders any “draw”
from infringement “relatively insignificant.” Id. at 1078.
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Grande, 2018 WL 1096871, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Feb.
28, 2018) (“Grande”) dismissed the plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claim, explaining
that when considering the “plausible, non-conclusory allegations” of the complaint:
The closest that the Complaint comes to addressing this
issue is the allegation that ‘the availability of music, and
particularly UMG’s music—acts as a powerful draw for
users of Grande’s service, who use that service to
download infringing music files using BitTorrent
protocols…’ This is not sufficient to show the ‘direct
financial interest’ necessary to support a vicarious
infringement claim. There are no allegations that
Grande’s actions in failing to adequately police their
infringing subscribers is a draw to subscribers to
purchase its services, so that they can use those services
to infringe on UMG’s (and others) copyrights. Instead
UMG only alleges that the existence of music and the
BitTorrent protocol is the draw. But that would impose
liability on every ISP, as the music at issue is available
on the Internet generally, as is the BitTorrent
protocol, and it is not something exclusively available
through Grande’s services.
Id. (emphasis added).

17
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While the very same concerns apply here, the Recommendation attempts to
distinguish Grande on the grounds that there were “no allegations that Grande’s
actions in failing to adequately police their infringing subscribers is a draw to
subscribers to purchase its services.”

Here, the Recommendation notes that

Plaintiffs alleged that Charter’s “failure to stop or take other action in response to
notices of infringement is a draw to current and prospective subscribers to purchase
and use Charter’s internet service to ‘pirate’ Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works,” though
such allegations are found nowhere in the Complaint. And the only remotely similar
allegations in ¶ 91 are entirely conclusory and speculative. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged the direct financial benefit prong of
vicarious liability.
B.

Charter Does Not Have the Practical Ability to Control the
Infringing Activity Necessary to Satisfy the Second Prong of
Vicarious Liability

With respect to the right and ability to control the infringing activity as a
practical matter, the Recommendation relies solely upon Charter’s user policy,
which contractually provides Charter the right to terminate accounts accused of
infringement. The Recommendation finds that even after receiving multiple notices,
Charter “declin[ed] to exercise a right to stop or limit the infringing activity...”
(citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930

18
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(2005)). There are no (and could be no) allegations, however, that Charter could
have accessed or disabled the infringing content, or prevented those using its internet
services from simply infringing on another internet service.
Even crediting Plaintiffs’ allegations that Charter has the “right” to terminate
subscriber’s access to Charter’s service, that does not mean that Charter has the
practical ability to control infringing activity, as required to state a claim for
vicarious liability. It is not possible for Charter to control infringing activity
involving content that it never touches, cannot see, cannot disable, and cannot track.
The Recommendation does not analyze these facts in connection with this claim, but
instead focuses solely on Charter’s ability to terminate accounts. But with internet
access being ubiquitous, Charter is clearly unable to prevent any former customer—
or one user or some subset of users on that customer’s account—from simply finding
another source of internet access to continue infringing Plaintiffs’ works.
The Recommendation also makes no mention of courts analyzing this element
that specifically distinguish between general-purpose ISPs like Charter or Google
and “closed system” file-sharing protocols and websites like BitTorrent or Napster.
See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007). For
instance, in Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit held that because:
Napster had a closed system requiring user registration,
and could terminate its users’ accounts and block their
access to the Napster system, Napster had the right and
ability to prevent its users from engaging in the
19
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infringing activity of uploading file names and
downloading Napster users’ music files through the
Napster system.
Id.
In contrast, the court found that an ISP like Google that simply offers internet
service and provides users the freedom to use that access as they see fit, had no such
ability—and therefore no liability. Id. at 1174-1175. While the court recognized
that Google had the ability to curtail some infringement indirectly by terminating
accounts, that ability was insufficient to establish vicarious liability as it did not
exercise the supervisory powers required to establish the claim. Id. at 1174 (“Google
cannot stop any of the third-party websites from reproducing, displaying, and
distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect 10’s images because that infringing
conduct takes place on the third-party websites. Google cannot terminate those thirdparty websites or block their ability to host and serve infringing full-size images on
the [i]nternet.”)
That distinction is squarely relevant here, but overlooked by the
Recommendation. Unlike with closed systems, Plaintiffs cannot plausibly allege
that Charter has the practical ability to identify and police infringing activity on the
internet. The Recommendation does not address this line of cases, again striking a
new path that threatens to expand potential liability exponentially for general
purpose ISPs, who simply provide access to the internet.

20
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The Recommendation relies on BMG Rights Management v. Cox
Communications, 149 F. Supp. 3d 634 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2015) and Grande,
decisions that focused almost exclusively on the “right” to control as set forth in user
agreements. Those cases found the “practical ability to control” to be the ability to
terminate entirely the internet access of accounts accused of infringement, without
regard for whether such action would actually halt the infringement (given that
presumably an infringer could continue to do so elsewhere), and without regard to
what legitimate uses it would inevitably also be terminating.
Courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” There is no plausible theory that Charter has the practical ability to
control the infringing activity, offering an independent basis to overrule the
Recommendation and grant Charter’s motion to dismiss.
IV.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE

Charter

requests

that

this

Court

overrule

the

Recommendation, and grant Charter’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for
vicarious liability for copyright infringement.
Given the import of the legal issues presented, Charter also once again
respectfully requests oral argument on this matter.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of November, 2019
By: s/ Craig D. Joyce
Craig D. Joyce
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